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NOTES
ADmINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF MEDICAL PRACTICES IN INDIANA.-

Since the time of Hippocrates a galaxy of schools or systems of healing,
many of them antagonistic to the others, have competed among
themselves for public recognition and approval. Most of them have some
intrinsic merit. A perusal of the statute books of any state will disclose the extent to which these gradations of theory and practice have
been recognized by the legislatures in their effort to regulate those engaged in the healing art.
The privilege of practicing medicine, using that word in its broadest
sense, is so intimately bound up with the health and well being of the
public that little doubt can be entertained that it is a proper subject of
police power regulation by the states.'
Sec. 63-1301, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., provides as follows: "It shall
hereafter be unlawful for any person to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics in this state without first obtaining a license so to do, as hereinafter provided." Succeeding sections 2 provide in substance that any
person desiring to begin the practice of medicine, surgery or obstetrics
must procure from the State Board of Medical Registration and Examination a certificate that such person is entitled to a license. The applicant for a certificate must turn in a diploma from a medical school
of "recognized standing" together with supporting affidavits and a fee
of ten dollars. In addition, an examination is required of all applicants
for licensure, except those seeking licensure through reciprocity.3 The
I State ex rel. Burroughs v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750 (1898);
Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862 (1902).
2 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Replacement, Title 63, Sec. 1302 et seq.
3 Rule 63-1302-3, Horack's Ind. Administrative Code, 1941.
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applicant is examined on the basic sciences, including anatomy, histology, embryology, pathology, bacteriology, physiology and chemistry.
The clinical sciences covered by the examination include general surgery, materia medica and therapeutics, theory and practice of medicine,
obstetrics, hygiene and sanitation, neurology, gynecology, medical jurisprudence, physical diagnosis, ophthalmology, otology and pediatrics.
The examination consists of 100 questions. Each section must be passed
with a score of at least seventy-five percent. 4 Certain of these subjects,
notably materia medica, are omitted in examinations looking to the socalled drugless branches, 5 as will be mentioned later.
Upon successfully completing the above described examination, the
applicant receives a certificate from the Board. This certificate is'presented by him to the clerk of the county in which he resides, and under
the law he is entitled to receive from the county clerk a license to practice medicine, surgery and obstetrics in the State of Indiana.
The State Board of Medical Registration and Examination was first
established in 1897, and originally consisted of five members.6 The
language used is interesting. It provides, among other things, that
"* * * no school or system of medicine shall have a majority representation on such board. * * * Each of the four (4) schools or systems of
medicine having the largest numerical representation in the state shall
have at least one (1) representative on the board." In 1905 the Board
was enlarged to six members, and then to seven members under the
Medical Practice Act of 1927. 7 It will be observed that the Act of 1897
and all acts amendatory thereof, carefully avoid the naming of specific
schools or systems of medicine in determining eligibility to board membership. The obvious purpose of. this is to allow osteopathic physicians,
chiropractors and other groups to participate in board membership, in
addition to the allopathic or "orthodox" practictioners (those holding
M.D. degrees).
The Board of Medical Registration and Examination meets periodically in the city of Indianapolis. The Board's seven members are appointed by the governor, for terms of four years. Its members are compensated in the amount of six dollars per diem plus necessary traveling
expenses. By law, the Board is invested with the power to fix minimum
standards of education and character of those applying for certificates;
also, the Board is authorized to establish and cause to be recorded a
schedule of the minimum requirements and rules for the recognition of
medical schools, provided that such rules shall not be retroactive in
effect.8 The Board may establish all necessary rules and regulations for
4

Rule 63-1302-4, Horack's Ind. Administrative Code, 1941.

5

Ibid.

6 Acts of 1897, ch. 169, Sec. 4, p. 255.
7 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Replacement, Tit. 63, Sec. 1312.
8 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., 1943 Replacement Tit. 63, Sec. 1306.
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the reciprocal recognition of certificates issued by other states. 9 The
Board's rule making power cannot be used to discriminate for or
against any school or system of medicine.' 0 The law sets two standards
which very definitely narrow the Board's administrative discretion: 11
"* * * no certificate shall be issued to any person * * * until he shall
have satisfied said Board that he has graduated at a reputable medical
college * * * and shall have passed before the Board a satisfactory examination as to his qualifications to practice medicine, surgery and
obstetrics * * * (except in the case of reciprocal certificates)." The
Board is given the power to revoke licenses obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. 12 And it may refuse to grant a certificate, or revoke one
already granted, where the person has been found guilty of a felony, or
is grossly immoral, or is addicted to the use of liquor or habit forming
drugs to such a degree as to render him unfit to practice medicine or
surgery. 1" The modus operandi is interesting: 14 A specific, written
charge, supported by affidavit, must be filed with the Board, making
definite and specific charges against the holder of a license. The Board
thereupon must fix a time and place for a hearing of such charges, the
notice to be at least twenty days before the time set for the hearing. In
the event of revocation, the Board must make an entry to that effect
upon its records, and a copy of the revocation order is forwarded to the
clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the license was issued,
which order is recorded on the margin of license record. In the case of
revocation, an appeal from the Board's order may be taken to the circuit or superior court of the county in which the license was issued.
Where the Board has refused to issue a certificate, resort may be had
to the circuit or superior courts of the county where the applicant lives.
But the appeal must be perfected within 30 days after the Board's order
in either event; otherwise, resort to the courts is forever barred. The
verified charges are treated as a complaint, and issues are formed thereon as in any civil case. The prosecuting attorney of the circuit in which
the case is being determined appears on behalf of the Board. If the
finding and judgment of the court is adverse to the petitioner on any
of the charges brought, the Board's order will stand. If all allegations
are determined adversely to the Board, its order will be vacated by the
court. Appeals by either the licensee or the county prosecutor representing the Board may be prosecuted to the Indiana Supreme Court,
but during the pendency of any appeal, the licensee cannot practice
legally.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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It will thus be observed that the review of the Board's orders, both
in the trial courts and on appeal, is very much akin to any other civil
action, even though the statute speaks in terms of "judgment of guilty"
and "accused."
In re Coffin 15 held that a deputy prosecuting attorney representing
the Board could not legally consent to a judgment in favor of an applicant appealing from a decision of the Board. The consent judgment
was set aside, and the Board was permitted to proceed further.
Numerous cases have arisen under the "gross immorality" clause of
Sec. 63-1306, which is set out as one ground upon which the Board
may revoke licenses. 16 It is not germane to our purpose to go into them
here, except to observe that in most cases the courts affirm the Board's
orders, and the evidence upon which the board bases its orders is not
normally weighed on appeal.
Where an applicant is refused an examination, and the Board declines to give him a certificate, it has been held that under this section
(63-1306) the proper remedy of the applicant is an appeal, and not
1
mandamus. 7
Sec. 63-1308 provides for the restoration of rights after revocation,
on a proper showing.
Sec. 63-1310 declares that the law shall not be construed as to discriminate against any school or system of medicine, or to prohibit
gratuitous services in emergencies, or in any way affect the administration of family remedies.
Sec. 63-1311 undertakes to define the practice of medicine in the
following language: "To open an office for such purpose or to announce
to the public in any way a readiness to practice medicine in any county
of the state, or to prescribe for, or to give surgical assistance to, or to
heal, cure or relieve those suffering from injury or deformity, or disease
of mind or body, or to advertise, or to announce to the public * * *
shall be to engage in the practice of medicine within the meaning of
this Act." The manufacture, advertisement or sale of proprietary
medicines, as well as persons endeavoring to prevent or cure disease
by prayer or spiritual means, are expressly exempted from the operation
of this section. Another part of the same section provides that where a
person is found to be practicing medicine within the State, who has
not been duly licensed, he may be enjoined from further practice by
152 Ind. 439, 53 N. E. 458 (1898).
16 Crum v. State Board of Med. Reg. and Exam., 219 Ind. 191, 37 N. E.
(2d) 65 (1941); Revocation of license to practice chiropractic, naturopathy and
electro-therapy.
17 State ex rel. Barnett v. State Board of Med. Reg., 173 Ind. 706, 91 N. E,
338 (1910).
15
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the attorney general, a prosecuting attorney, the Board acting on its
own initiative, or any citizen. Such actions are maintained in the name
of the State.
In charging a person with practicing medicine without a license under Sec. 63-1311, it is sufficient to allege that fact generally, and it is
not necessary to negative the exceptions contained in the statute.' 8 And
in State ex rel. Indiana State Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Cole 19 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the defendant's answer to the Board's suit, to the effect that the Board had wrongfully denied him a license to practice, merely amounted to a collateral
attack upon the action of the Board, and could avail the defendant
nothing.
Sec. 63-1316 deals specifically with osteopathy, and is interesting
because it highlights the traditional professional antagonism between
the osteopaths and the M.D.'s. An applicant for an osteopathy certificate, under this section, must pass the examination on all basic and
clinical sciences, except materia medica. With this sole exception, he is
on an equal footing with the M.D. applicants. The law goes on to state
categorically that the holder of a license in osteopathy shall "have the
right to practice osteopathy, surgery and obstetrics and to administer
anesthetics, antiseptics and narcotics." This is perhaps justified when
one reflects on the high standards of the American Osteopathic Association, which is recognized by most state licensing boards as the official accrediting agency for osteopathic colleges.20 In any event, the
fact that osteopaths are licensed to practice all forms of surgery in
Indiana is not something peculiar to this State. The same rule obtains
in Arizona, 2 ' California, 22 Colorado, 28 Delaware,2 4 District of Columbia,2 5 Florida, 26 Kentucky, 27 Maine,2 8 Massachusetts,2 9 Michigan, 30
Missouri, 31 New Mexico, 82 Oklahoma, 33 Oregon,3 4 Pennsylvania, 35
18 Melville v. State, 173 Ind. 352, 89 N. E. 490 (1910); Beyer v. State, 199
Ind. 647, 158 N. E. 477 (1928).
19 215 Ind. 562, 20 N. E. (2d) 972 (1939).
20
See Excellent Article in 23 N. Car. Law Rev. 129, by A. B. Weldon.
21 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), Sec. 67-2101, et seq.

22
23

Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1944) Act 5727, Sec. 1, et seq.
Col. Stat. Ann., c. 109, Sec. 6.

24
25

Del. Rev. Code (1935), Sec. 931; Op. Atty. Gen., Mar. 13, 1939.

26

D. C. Code, Sec. 2-109, et seq.
F. S. A. (1943), Sec. 459.01, et seq.

27
28

Ky. Rev. Stat. (Cullen, 1943), Sec. 311.010(2a), et seq.

33

Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941), Tit. 59, Sec. 630.

34
35

Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1939), Sec. 54-821.
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941), Tit. 63, Sec. 266, 68.

Me. Gen. Code.
29 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1942), c. 112, Sec. 10.
30 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1937), Sec. 14.574.
31 Rev. Stat. Mo. (1939) Sec. 10044.
32 N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1941), Sec. 51-809.
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Rhode Island,36 Tennessee, 7 Utah,38 Vermont,3 9 Virginia, 40 Washington, 41 and West Virginia.42 In six other states, including New York,
osteopathic physicians and surgeons are licensed to practice surgery on
a restricted basis.43 In all of the states noted above, with the exception
of Indiana and New York, osteopaths are authorized to practice medicine, as well as surgery, on the same terms as allopathic physicians and
with no limitations whatsoever as to practice rights. This means the
administration of drugs in all forms. But in Indiana, as we have seen,
the osteopath, although unrestricted in surgery, is limited in his use of
drugs to anesthetics, antiseptics and narcotics.
Under the law as it is now constituted, the complexion of the Board
can change quite radically as relative strength of the various schools
and systems represented thereon advance and decline. The social objective involved is to keep the regulatory features of our Medical
Practice Act in reasonable adjustment with the changing climate of
medical practice.
David S. Landis.

ADmISSIONS By PARTIEs OR OTHERS INTERESTED IN THE CASE.-We
shall be concerned in this paper with only those admissions by parties
to the record. In Corpus Juris I it is stated that "admissions of a party
to the record are competent against him, even though the declarant is
prosecuting or defending the action in a representative capacity. The
rule applies whether the admissions relate to the fact in issue or to a
fact relevant to the issue, and regardless of the time when they were
made, unless of course, the time of the statement of itself renders it
irrelevant to the issue on which it is offered. Admissibility is not conditional upon showing that the conduct of the party offering the statement was affected by it or his ability to fix the time and place when it
was made, provided the statement is satisfactorily traced to the party.
Neither is it necessary that the admissions should be entirely consistent
with the other evidence introduced by the party by whom they are
shown. Where admissions are offered as those of a party, the declarant
must be a party to the record at the time of the offer."
386 R. I. Acts (1940), Ch. 889.
37

38

Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1941), Sec. 7007.
Utah Code Ann. (1943), Sec. 79, et seq.

39 Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), Sec. 7477.
40 Va. Code Ann., Sec. 1609(c).
41 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1933), Sec. 1006.
42 W. Va. Code Ann. (Mfichie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943), Sec. 2984.
43 N. Y. Ed. Law Sec. 1262.
1 22 Corpus Juris 400 p. 345.
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The recent Ohio case of Conrad v. Kirby 2 held that "It is competent
to show admissions made by parties to record, and such statements are
evidence for adverse party and if testimony is of such a character as to
constitute an admission of a party, it is not necessary to lay foundation
for its reception, or to cross examine the party on subject covered by
testimony." A late Ohio case 3 held that "admissions are declarations
against interest may be given in evidence against declarant." In Illinois
the court held in People ex rel Nelson v. Central Manufacturing District
Bank 4 that "the admission of a party to a fact, no matter how made
may be given in evidence against him."
As to the admissibility of statements as to particular facts, the court
held in River Park District v. Brand 5 that in a condemnation suit
testimony concerning conversations between landowner and Park Commissioners trying to buy property was held competent as admissions
against landowner's interests. In Wicker v. Kinney 6 the court said that
"in personal injury action against automobile owner testimony as to
admissions by defendant, showing that he owned and operated automobile and that accident happened held admissible." In Smith v. Cleveland
Railway Company 7 the court said that an "expert's testimony as to
plaintiff's statements, during physical examination, that he sustained
only injury then complained of, two months before, held admissible
against him."
Statements of grantor, whether before or alter signing of the deed,
which tend to rebut the claim of fraud therein, are competent as declarations against interest the court pointed out in McAdams v. McAdams.8
In an action on a note in Kyger v. Stallings 9 it was held that evidence
that the maker had said to the payee that she owed the note but would
not pay it until she got ready held admissible. In the Illinois case of
Lyman v. Kaul 1o the court held that "in a will contest by testator's
sole heir, statements of principal devisee as to contestant's having married a woman of immoral character, and that, if she were testator, she
would cut him off, were admissible as statements against her interest."
In an action for injuries sustained by plaintiffs when their automobile struck a parked automobile when an attempt was made to avoid
striking the defendant's automobile which was allegedly driven out onto
the state highway in path of the plaintiff's automobile without defend2

31 N. E. (2d) 168, 66 Ohio App. 359 (1940).

3 In Re Evans Estate, 41 N. E. (2d) 410, 71 Ohio App. 127 (1941).
28 N. E. (2d) 154, 306 Ill. App. 15 (1927).
158 N. E. 687, 327 In1. 294 (1927).
6 19 Ohio App. 346 (1924).
7
164 N. E. 59, 30 Ohio App. 21 (1928).
8 ,88 N. E. 542, 80 Ohio St. 232 (1909).
9
103 N. E. 674, 55 Ind. App. 196 (1913).
10 113 N. E. 944, 275 Ill. 11 (1916).
4

5
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ant stopping at stop sign the court held in Hill v. Hiles 11 that evidence
that one of the plaintiff's paid the cost of repairing the damages to the
parked automobile was not competent as an admission of negligence by
12
plaintiffs, which would preclude them from recovering. In re Heile,
an Ohio case, holds that in an action arising out of automobile accident,
admissions by a defendant while narrating circumstances of an accident
to third person would lie inadmissible against co-defendants.
The court held in Hollenback v. Todd Isthat where there is evidence
tending to show that the father of the claimant was interested in the
property attached, conversations and admissions on the part of the
father with respect to the property are admissible in evidence, although
not authorized or assented to by the son, the claimant. A later Illinois
decision affirmed this 14 where in an action by an administrator for
death of child who was struck by automobile evidence that parents on
whose behalf action was brought, permitted the child to play in public
road, and evidence of parents' admissions with respect to that subject,
was admissible on issue of contributory negligence of the parents.
In cases where persons are suing or defending in different character
or capacity the court held in O'Brien v. Flanders15 that "on the trial
of a proceeding supplementary to execution by a creditor against his
debtor and a bank alleged to have funds of the latter on deposit, the
answer of such banks, under oath of its president, filed in the cause, is
not evidence against the debtor." An Illinois case discussing the same
6
principle held in Hassey v. A. C. Allyn & Co.1 that "in an action
against an investment company for breach of contract to repurchase
stock from plaintiff upon termination of his employment by the corporation, action of the corporation's board of directors, participated in
by plaintiff as a director, authorizing corporation's purchase of stock
owned by a salesman who left corporation's employ, was properly admitted as an admission against interest."
A recent Ohio case 17 said, however, that a letter written by guardian
of an incompetent after incompetent's death, but before guardian filed
final accounts and was appointed administratrix, was inadmissible in action by her as administratrix on debt due incompetent, as respects admission against incomlIetent's interest and exclusion of remainder of the
letter after material part thereof was admitted was not error.
8
In cases of joint interest of parties in Phillips v. Gannan 1 the court
held that "declarations as to the mental condition of the grantor, made
App. 321 (1941).
11 32 N. E. (2d) 933, 309 Ill.
12 29 N. E. (2d) 175, 65 Ohio App. 45 (1939).
13 8 N. E. 829, 119 111. S43 (1886).
App. 564 (1939).
14 Isley v. McClandish, 20 N. E. (2d) 890, 299 Ill.
15

58 Ind. 22 (1877).

App. 37 (1940).
28 N. E. (2d) 164, 306 Ill.
17 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 31 N. E. (2d) 165, 66 Ohio App. 315 (1940).
18 92 N. E. 616, 246 I1. 98 (1910).
16
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by one of the grantees about the time the deed was executed, not having been made in the presence of the other grantee, are inadmissible
against them in a suit to avoid the deed for mental incapacity of the
grantor." It was held in the Indiana case of Indianapolis and Cincinnati Traction Company v. Wiles 19 that admissions of one joint owner
of land sought to be condemned for an electric railroad right of way
made in the absence of other owners are incompetent.
In a later Illinois case 20 the court said that in a will contest, statements or admissions made by devisee concerning testimentary capacity
of testator or acts of undue influence in procuring execution of will are
not admissible where interests of devisees are separate, although they
will be admitted where interests of devisees are joint.
Thomas F. Bremer.

A SURVEY oF ILLINOIS LAW 1943-1944.-The constitutionality of
the Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was involved in the
case of Regan v. Kroger Grocer and Baking Co.1 Plaintiff alleged he
had been charged more than the ceiling price and the defendant
claimed the statute was unconstitutional, that it could not be enforced
in the courts of Illinois, that it violated the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution. The court held that the validity of the act could
be made an issue in actions to enforce its provisions, so that there was
no violation of due process. The court further upheld the constitutionality of the act under the war powers of the Congress and said that
the state court was not enforcing the penal laws of a foreign jurisdiction, in that acts of Congress are laws of Illinois as well, and that in
the enforcement of such laws the state courts are given concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts.
In the case of People ex rel Baker v. Strantz 2 a statute authorizing
a judge or justice of the peace to order examination and treatment of
any person charged with crime who may be suffering from any communicable venereal disease was held not to violate the due process
clause in view of the fact that such examination will only be ordered
"when it appears from the evidence that the accused person is suffering from such disease."
With regard to municipal corporations, the validity of municipal
ordinances vacating public streets was questioned in two cases, in each of
which the muncipality sought to justify its action under provisions of the
19

91 N. E. 161, 174 Ind. 236 (1910).
Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 198 N. E. 432, 361 Ill. 499 (1935).
1 386 Ill.
284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 (1944).
2 386 Ill.
360, S4 N. E. (2d) 441 (1944).
20
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statute which purports to declare that municipal action in such case is
conclusive. This contention was upheld in People ex rel Hill v. Eakin 3
when it was found that some public benefit was derived from the vacation ordinance but in People ex rel Foote v. Kelly 4 the court held that
the determination of the City Council is not necessarily conclusive on
the courts, despite the language of the statute and that if there is an
allegation that no public benefit arises from the vacation ordinance,
the court can and will entertain such suit.
Failure by a municipal corporation to provide an appropriation in
advance was held to be a reason to repudiate a contract to purchase a
road grader in Galion Iron Works and ManufacturingCompany v. City
of Georgetown 5 and as that transaction was invalid, it. necessarily followed that there could be no recovery for the use made by the municipality of the equipment.
Questions concerning tort liability of municipal corporations arose
in McKeown v. City of Chicago 6 where the negligent act of city firemen in flooding a vacant lot for ice-skating purposes was held sufficient
to establish municipal liability since it did not constitute a governmental function. For that matter carelessness in burning brush which
had been removed from city streets after a storm so that private property was destroyed was held actionable in Peterson v. City of Gibson.7
The validity of a city ordinance requiring that milk be delivered in
"standard milk bottles" was upheld in Dean Milk Company v. City of
Chicago 8 where paper containers were said not to fulfill the statutory
requirement. This act was later amended to permit the use of single
service paper containers.0
The zoning case of City of Watseka v. Blatt 10 forbade the use of
land for a junk yard on the ground that the power of the City Council
to adopt zoning ordinances was a delegated power which could not be
delegated by it to a zoning board, hence the restriction in question was
invalid.
The district sued to enjoin the county collector of Will County from
collecting real estate taxes levied against that portion of the district's
main channel located within such county in the case of Sanitary District of Chicago v. Rhodes.11 Exemption was claimed on the theory
that the channel constituted "public grounds owned by a municipal
8
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

IRI. 383, 50 N. E. (2d) 474 (1943).
IIl. 543, 53 N. E. (2d) 429 (1944).
IlL. App. 97, 54 N. E. (2d) 601 (1944).
III. App. 563, 49 N. E. (2d) 729 (1943).
I. App. 97, 54 N. E. (2d) 74 (.1944).
ILL. 565, 53 N. E. (2d) 612 (1944).
Municipal Code, Chicago, Sec. 154-14.
383
385
a22
319
322
385

320 f1l. App. 191, 50 N. E. (2d) 589 (1943).
386 I1H.269, 53 N. E. (2d) 869 (1944).
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corporation and used exclusively for public purposes." Upon finding
that the channel was not used exclusively for public purposes, a decree
denying an injunction was affirmed on the fundamental proposition that
laws exempting property from taxation will be subject to strict construction.
An attempt by the legislature to impose taxes on the production of
oil 'within the state collapsed in the decision of the Ohio Oil Company
v. 'Wright 12 case which held the statute unconstitutional as a violation
of Section 1, Article IX of the State Constitution on the theory that
the tax was not one on an occupation but rather a direct tax on income
from property hence a direct tax on the property itself, while in People ex rel Voorhees v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad13 the
court held a town levy for "home relief, (including veterans)" was invalid due to the fact that it was the duty of the county to provide for
destitute veterans and the duty of the township was limited to the care
of paupers.
John F. Power.

DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE - THE USE OF MODELs.-The courts
of this country have at times found it expedient and proper in trials before jury to allow either or both of the parties to place before the court
and jury a model of some piece of equipment or property about which
an important question revolves in order to better explain the oral testimony of a witness. The purpose here is to determine under what rules
the courts either admit or reject the use of such models.
In an early New York case where the question in issue was whether
a certain bridge was properly constructed the court admitted a model
of the bridge in order to show the general construction of said bridge to
the jury. The court also said the question of accuracy, that is, of the
model, was for the jury to decide.'
The next case we note is where, in a personal injury suit, the defendant was allowed to present a model of a "feed works" over the objection of the plaintiff. The court in holding that this admission was
not error, said, "There was not error in admitting the platt and model
after the necessary explanations have been made. They were valuable,
no doubt, in giving the jury a general idea of the situation, and the defects or omissions were so clearly pointed out that the jury could not
have been misled." 2 Thus it is seen that when the model is important
12
13

386 11. 206, 53 N. E. (2d) 966 (1944).
386 Ill.
200, 53 N. E. (2d) 963 (1944).

1 Cooledge v. City of New York, et al. 99 App. Div. 175; 90 N. Y. S. 1078

(1904).
2

Burroughs v. Curtiss Lumber Co., 58 Ore. 270; 114 P. 103 (1911).
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in demonstrating to the jury some important fact upon which the case
will turn it is not error to admit such model. It is also well to note that
before admission the model and its purposes must be explained to the
court.
In a 1911 case the Federal Court held a model of a coupler on a
railroad car, shown for the purpose of illustrating a mechanical defect,
was admissible, although the model varied slightly from the coupler on
the car involved.3 It must be remembered that the mechanical principle
was one of the important questions to be decided in the case at hand
because if it had not been relevant to the issue it would not have been
admissible. Again in an Alabama case where the plaintiff was trying
to recover from a railroad for damages suffered to timber from a fire
alleged to have been caused by the defendant's passing engine, the
court allowed a model similar in construction to the engine in question
to be used to explain said engine's construction and equipment. 4 Thus
it is clear models used to explain complicated mechanical principles are
admissible.
Models have been used to reconstruct situations such as automobile
accidents so that the jury and court would have a better idea as to
what took place. In holding that toy automobiles used as above explained by the trial court did not constitute error the supreme court of
Colorado said, "Error is assigned as to evidence. The court admitted
the map, drawn by one of the defendant's attorneys, of the road at the
scene of the accident in question, drawn to scale, and three toy automobiles built to scale. We can see no error in this. The toys were, of
course, for illustration, in connection with testimony, and the plaintiff could have had an instruction to that effect if she asked." 5 Concerning the same point, that is admitting models for illustrative purposes the Illinois supreme court said, "It is the constant practice in the
courts to receive in evidence models, maps, and diagrams for the purpose of giving more accurate information of objects or places which
cannot be conveniently shown to the jury. The diagrams, drawings, or
models are not introduced as evidence within themselves, but for the
purpose of enabling the jury to understand and apply the testimony in
the case." 6 Thus from the last two cited cases it can be said that
models are primarily used so that the jury can better understand the
testimony offered which by itself may be more or less confusing.
The courts hold the presentation of models is important. In a case
where a woman sued a railroad company because of a hernia allegedly
caused when boarding defendant's train, the defendant railroad offered
an exact model of the step plaintiff had ascended, but the trial court
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 191 Fed. 302 (1911).
Pettus v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 214 Ala. 178; 106 So. 807 (1925).
5 Small v. Clark, 83 Colo. 211; 263 P. 933 (1928).
6 Reinke v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 260 Ill. 380; 103 N. E. 236 (1913).
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refused to allow this demonstration. This refusal was held to be error,
by the supreme court, which said as follows: (referring to the railroad
corporation): "It tendered and offered to introduce that model, (the
step) but the court overruled its motion, which we think was error, as
will be seen from the Dean case, supra, and the correctness of the rule
permitting the introduction of such accurately established models is
fortified by the text in 22 C. J. 768, § 869, a part of which says: 'In
cases where the things they represent are relevant, models when properly identified and authenticated, are admissible as a species of real
evidence of the thing they represent. * * * Thus a model machine, a
mechanical device, or a bridge may be submitted to the jury to aid
them in understanding how an event occurred or might have been prevented.' . . ." 7 It is well to note in Nebraska the supreme court held it
not error to refuse to admit a model where the expert testifying fully
explained himself so that there would be little need for a model.8 Thus
it can be said that models can be either admitted or rejected at the
discretion of the trial judge.
Thus it is clear that the admission of a model is left to the discretion
of the trial judge, but it is also well to note that the abuse of this discretion is reversible error. In other words when a model is offered and
said model is to be used for demonstrative purposes, or illustration in
conjunction with a witness's testimony, and the model is a coriect and
true copy said exclusion will be reversible error.
In a 1940 Michigan case the question of admitting a model into
evidence when the accuracy of said model was in question, the court
said: "When the correctness of the illustrative representation is disputed if there is room for finding for the offering party, the trial court
may admit it and submit the question to the jury for ultimate determination." Thus it is seen that the question of accuracy is left to the
jury, but the relevancy of the model is to be determined by the judge.
Speaking of models in general, the Michigan court said: "A photograph
or model is used only as a 'non-verbal mode of expressing a witness's
testimony' (Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 790), and as testimonial aid it
may often help the jury to understand the evidence more clearly than
they could from the words of any witness .... The proposed aid must
be sponsored by a witness who uses it to relate his personal knowledge
or scientific skill and understanding. . . ." 9
The question as to abuse of discretion by the trial court in Massachusetts 10 was raised when the court allowed the defendant to bring
7 Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Duvall, 263 Ky. 387; 92 S. W. (2d) 363
(1936); Bowling Green Gas Light Co. v. Deans Ex's. 142 Ky. 678; 134 S. W.
1115.
8 Falkinbury v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 103 Neb. 572; 273 N. W.
478 (1937).
9 Finch v. W. R. Roach Co., 295 Mich. 589; 295 N. W. 324 (1940).
10 Everson v. Casualty Co. of America, 208 Mass. 214; 94 N. E. 459 (1911).
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in and present to the jury for inspection a model of a "drying chamber"
about which an important issue in the case revolved. The Supreme Court
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting this
model because it aided the jury in obtaining a better understanding of
the testimony. It is to be noted that relevancy and admissibility are to
be determined at the discretion of the trial judge.
Accuracy of-models-offered in evidence has arisen in many cases, but
one of the best cases was decided by the Wisconsin court.'1 In this case
the trial court had admitted a model demonstrating the swing, into a
safety zone, that the rear car of a train makes as it rounds a certain
turn. The Supreme Court took the view that the model grossly misrepresented the contour of the safety zone and that the model also
grossly exaggerated the extent the rear car entered the safety zone. The
Supreme Court in the following words held the admission of this model
error: "The prejudicial effect of the exhibit is manifest. Its receipt
would require a new trial of the case if it were not dismissed."
From this case it can be said that if the model admitted does not
conform to the facts as they exist said admission will be reversible error. It is the duty of the trial judge to make a complete investigation,
by testimony or personal investigation of the fact or situation represented by the model before allowing this model to be used.
The rules for the use of models in court can be summed up in a few
short lines. First, the model must be used in conjunction with the testimony of a witness. Secondly, the model must be accurate to a degree
that it will not distort the situation as it really is or was. Thirdly, the
model must be used either to describe a situation or illustrate a mechanical principle or the general construction of some piece of machinery
that could not be conveniently described or shown to the jury. Finally, a
model may be used at the discretion of the trial judge to aid the jury
in understanding how an event occurred or might have been prevented.
L. E. Merman.

IaRsIsTmLE ImULsE As A PLEA IN CoLoRDo.-Traditionally
courts have listened to pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity with
somewhat hesitant and dimmed ears. Such a position is understandable
and was frequently the correct attitude, for there is probably no other
single principle in criminal law susceptible of so much abuse as is this
plea. The subjective nature of the subject matter, the pathos accompanying the plea, the passions aroused and the blinding of facts by
court-room dramatists all manifestly lend themselves to frequent and
11

Hadrian et al. v. Milwaukee Electric Railway and Transport Co., 214 Wis.

122 (1942).
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flagrant abuses. For this reason courts have historically aligned themselves to the rule established in the famous M'Naghten's case. Although
this test that came to be known as the "right and wrong" test has become part of criminal jurisprudence in America in many jurisdictions,
it has not been immune from judicial criticism. So severe has this
criticism become that in many states the rule has been expressly abrogated. In State v. Keerl, we find the court stating that instructions
following the lines laid down in M'Naghten's case are erroneous and
further: "* * * that they [instructions based upon the rule] are radically wrong and should never be given." Another court that expressly
criticized the rule is found in State v. Jones 2 in which we find a discussion of the rule that pointed out, "the absurdity as well as the inhumanity of it."
The courts that abrogated the right and wrong test were those that
then turned to a more refined, a more psychological rule to aid them
in the determination of insanity as an exculpating factor of criminal
acts. It was to these courts that the irresistible impulse as a defense was
particularly addressed and it was with these courts that it has been
accepted and given judicial recognition. It is the recognition given this
plea in Colorado that we shall examine in this note.
That the principle of irresistible impulses opened the door for even
further judicial abuse is not difficult to perceive. So perhaps there is
much to be said for courts that refuse to acknowledge the plea. Yet,
that it is, in the proper case to which it is applied, not only the better
rule, but imperative, is not to be doubted by those conversant with
medico-jurisprudence. The difficulty in its use is not one of substance
but only one of application. As Wharton says, in his treatise dealing
with the plea: "In the enunciation of this conclusion (of irresistible
impulse) there should be the strictest caution, and in the application
of it the most jealous scrutiny." 3
Much of the unfavorable reception given the principle has, no doubt,
been fostered by a misinterpretation of the true elements that comprise the impulse. It is never to be used unless underlying the act and as
a basis is a pre-existing mental disease. It can, therefore, never be used
properly unless the mental condition is shown to exist. In its correct
application it must be distinguished from moral insanity, delusional insanity, moral obliquity, mental depravity, passion arising from anger,
hatred, revenge and other evil conditions, or irresistible impulses arising because of emotion. It is with this last condition that the true irresistible impulse has been most frequently confused both by the lay
mind and by the courts.
1 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362 (1904).
2 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871).
3
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Legal definitions are frequently incomplete and always difficult to
formulate. But, to gain a better understanding of the principle, an examination will be made of the two definitions of the plea, as stated by
perhaps two of the foremost authorities in American criminal law.
Miller defines the principle as follows, giving it three essential elements:
"The theory of this test is that a person acts under an insane, irresistible
impulse when, from disease of the mind, he is incapable of restraining
himself, though he may know that he is doing wrong. In other words,
a person may know, at the time the act was committed: (1) The nature
and quality of the act he was doing, (2) that what he was doing was
wrong, but still by reason of the duress of a mental disease, (3) he may
have lost the power to choose between the right and wrong and to
avoid doing the act; his free agency being at the time destroyed." 4
Wharton, in his authoritative work, states the phrase irresistible impulse to be: "That plea of exculpating insanity in which the accused is
driven to the commission of crime by an internal force, the source of
whose impetus is an actual existing disease of the mind, by reason of
which he is incapable of offering such internal resistance as would prevent commission of the crime." 5 He makes a further distinction of the
plea in distinguishing between that form of impulse that forces a person to act notwithstanding the fact that the actor knows the act to be
wrong, and that type of impulse that destroys the person's ability to
realize that his acts are wrong. It is with the former distinction that
the writer is interested, for it logically follows that courts which would
acquit in the former situation would, a fortiori, acquit in the latter situation, which is more consonant with the right and wrong test.
The doctrine as defined by Wharton, that is the impulse that overwhelms volition making it impossible for the actor to refrain from accomplishing his criminal action even though he realized the act to be
wrong is recognized in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. 6
The plea was formerly recognized in Iowa, but was repudiated in State
v. Buck and no longer applies in that jurisdiction. 7 All other jurisdic4 Miller's Criminal Law, No. 37, p. 127 (1934).

5 Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. I, No. 408, p. 602.
6 81 Ala. 557, 2 So. 854 (1886); 146 Ark. 509, 226 S. W. 37 (1920); 60 Colo.
425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915) ; 40 Conn. 136 (1873); 9 Houst. 470, 14 Atl. 550 (1880) ;
36 Fed. (2d) 548, 70 A. L. R. 654 (1929); 152 Ga. 243, 109 S. E. 661 (1921); 148
Ill.
467, 36 N. E. 95 (1894); 118 Ind. 482, 21 N. E. 285 (1889); 225 Ky. 492, 9
S. W. (2d) 132 (1928); 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904); 44 Mont. 354, 120 Pac.
234 (1911); 219 Mass. 1, 106 N. E. 545 1914); 134 Mich. 625, 96 N. W. 1061
(1903); 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871); 284 Penn. 311, 131 AUt. 229 (1925);
43 Utah, 135, 134 Pac. 632 (1913); 93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391 (1919); 107 Va. 912,
60 S. E. 99 (1908) ; 23 Wash. 289, 63 Pac. 258 (1900).
7
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tions have either expressly repudiated the plea or have refused to acknowledge it by implication in those cases brought before its tribunals.
In spite of the importance of the principle in the annals of criminal
law the plea was not involved in any adjudication in Colorado until
1915. It was in that year that the leading case of Ryan v. People came
before the courts and it was that case that lighted the legal beacons
that guide courts in that jurisdiction today. An annotation in the
American Law Reports remarks on the dearth of cases on point: "Ryan
v. People, which appears to be the only decision on the doctrine of irresistible impulse from that jurisdiction, undoubtedly announces and
adopts the doctrine as an element in the law regarding insanity." 8
The Colorado courts repudiated the rule established in M'Naghten's
case expressly in Ryan v. People and despite a manifest dearth of adjudications on the exact point since that time the rule of irresistible impulse as laid down in the Ryan case is still the law in that state today.
In the Ryan case the defense was not strictly one of irresistible impulse, but rather one of delusional insanity. Yet the court not only allowed the recognition of that plea but went beyond the instant case
and propounded the general rule in that state to be as follows: "A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the act as to be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to it, or being able to so
distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease as to
destroy the will power and render him incapable of choosing the right
and refraining him from doing the wrong, is not accountable. And this
is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested, by insane delusions
of whatever nature, by irresistibleimpulse or otherwise." 9
Such a broad rule covers both situations mentioned and distinguished
by Wharton and consequently it is immaterial whether the actor was
aware that his actions were right or wrong. For, under the rule laid
down in the Ryan case, both those who are aware of the culpable nature of their actions but are unable to stop because of a previous mental
condition and those whose concepts of right and wrong are totally destroyed can successfully avail themselves of the plea of not guilty because of an irresistible impulse.
The rule seems to have been followed in later cases for in Oldham
v. People 10 we find the state Supreme Court reversing a lower court's
decision for submitting the following instruction: "The court instructs
the jury that an insane delusion, to be a defense must be a mental delusion connected with the offense charged and it must be such a delusion which, if true, would excuse the crime committed." Not only
70 A. L. R. 666.
Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915).
10 158 Pac. 148, 61 Colo. 413 (1916).
8
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did the upper court reverse the judgment because the instruction was
too limited in scope, and therefore erroneous, but called it an incorrect
legal principle.
In Shank v. People 11 the court refused to give an instruction copied
verbatim from the opinion of Ryan v. People but this was held to be
no error because the court had previously given an instruction covering
adequately criminal intent and insanity. This refusal in no way abrogates or even hints of repudiation of the recognition of the plea of irresistible impulse in that jurisdiction.
Recognizing the abuses that are inherent in a plea of insanity,
Colorado has adopted a most practical, as well as a sound and intelligent, approach to the problem. There is a statutory provision that requires any defendant pleading insanity in criminal actions to spend a
certain time at the state institution for observation and at the trial
impartial competent medical experts testify as to the mental condition
of the defendant.1 2 In the instances employed the procedure has done
substantial justice, not only to the state but also to the defendant. Such
a procedure is highly commendable and has done much to take the uncertain mysticism from the plea of insanity in criminal actions. That
it is unjust and wrong to punish a defendant who, because of a preexisting mental condition, is unable to refrain from criminal acts even
though he may be aware of the criminality of the acts is undoubted. By
giving judicial recognition to the plea of insanity by reason of irresistible
impulse and making possible observation and testimony of highly skilled
medical experts and making a working procedure for the correct use of
the plea Colorado courts have wiped away some rather oppressive legal
cobwebs that were spun by continental courts over a hundred years ago.
Francis J. Paulson.

LAW OF CONTRACTS IN REGARD TO PRIZE

CONTESTS.-It seems that

many Americans cannot resist taking a chance in one form or another,
hence it is not surprising to find millions of our citizens entering prize
contests every year. Consequently the law governing prize contests affects many of us though few probably realize it. Of course the relationship between the sponsor and the contestant is a contractual relationship, therefore we must see how the law of contract applies to contests.
First let us discuss offer and acceptance. In this regard contest cases
resemble reward cases.' The offer is unilateral and demands some act
247 Pac. 559, 79 Colo. 576 (1926).
12 Colo. Stat. Ann., ch. 48, Sections 507, 508 (1935).
1 Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73, 23 L. Ed. 697.
11
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or acts to constitute acceptance. It was held in Scott v. Peoples Monthly
Co. that to constitute an acceptance of the offer made by one instituting a prize contest, so as to give rise to a contract, a contestant must
2
substantially comply with the terms and conditions fixed.
Such an offer, although usually made to the general public, is revocable and may be withdrawn at any time.3 In Holt v. Wood 4 we
find a good discussion of offer and acceptance in contest cases. Here
the court said, "The defendants offered to give a house and lot to a
person who would suggest a name for the village that might finally be
accepted. The plaintiff, within the time specified, suggested a name
and that was finally adopted. She accepted their offer and complied
with all its conditions. The name she suggested was accepted and
adopted. Here are all the essential elements of a contract."
In Hood v. Polish National Alliance we see that after the offer has
been accepted an enforceable contract results. 5 In the Hood case there
was a contest to select an architect to plan and supervise the construction of a building for a fraternal society, the first prize was a sum of
money, employment as architect, and the usual commission on the
cost of the building less the cash prize. One of the competing architects
was awarded first prize and was paid the cash portion of the award.
It was held by the court that a mutual contract was effected under
which both the society and the architect could be compelled to perform or pay damages.
For the acceptance to be good, however, it must comply substantially with the offer. In the Scott case, supra, where the contestant intentionally violated one of the rules of a word building contest by including
in his list obsolete, dialects and foreign words, the court held that said
contestant was not entitled to first prize even though he had a larger
number of permissible words than any other contestant. 6
As to consideration, we see immediately that since contest contracts
are unilateral the act of acceptance is the consideration. In Alvord v.
Smith, an Indiana case, it was held that a premium offered to the owner
of the horse making the best time in a proposed race may be recovered
by appropriate action since, the doing of the act furnished a sufficient
7
consideration to support the contract.
Next we must focus our attention upon the possibility of changing
the rules after contestants have entered the contest. It is generally
agreed that a change in rules is not binding upon a contestant until he
2

209 Iowa 503, 228 N. W. 263 (1929).

3

Hertz v. Montgomery journal Publishing Co., 9 Ala. App. 178, 62 So. 564

(1913).
246 DI. App. 137 (1927).
Scott v. Peoples Monthly Co. (2 Supra).
6 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 499, 24 Pittsburgh L. J. (N. S.) 443 (1894).
7 63 Ind. 58 (1878).
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receives notice of the change. Just what constitutes notice is another
question. In Long v. Chronicle Publishing Co. it was held that notice
of change in rules published in newspaper was not binding on the contestants not reading it, personal notice being required. 8 In many cases
a change in the rules amounts to a breach. 9
Again in Mooney v. Daily News Co. of Minneapolis it was held that
the person making an offer of specified compensation to the person obtaining the highest vote based on paid subscriptions to a newspaper, is
bound by its terms after acceptance and cannot, without the consent
of either party, change the terms of the offer or give to them an interpretation contrary to their true meaning.1 0
Many interesting cases arise when we consider performance and
breach of the contest contract. In Cope v. Hastings it was held that
architects whose plans violate the terms of the contest in which they
enter by drawing plans for a public building whose cost would exceed
the appropriation therefore had no cause of action when the state commission refused to consider their designs."1 In an interesting Texas case
a contestant for a prize offered by a business college for the greatest
amount of money paid in for scholarship was held entitled to credit for
the amount presented by certain tables desired by the college and which
were accepted by the college as part payment on the scholarship ac12
count of the maker of the tables.
In Shorey v. Daniel the court held that the winner of second prize
offered in a newspaper subscription contest described as a "$500 Yuma
Mesa lot," is justified in assuming that the value of lot to be awarded
is $500, and is entitled to treat an attempted conveyance of a lot of less
value as a breach of contract, and to recover the amount of damage where
contestant did not know when she entered the contest that a particular
lot had been selected for the winner of the second prize.' 3
Another phase of contest contract worth discussion is the usual
clause that decision of the judges is final. This is not always enforced
at law. For example in Minton v. F. G. Smith Piano Co. of Washington
it was said that one who, in sending an answer to an advertised offer
of a prize for a correct solution of a problem, agrees to abide by the
decision of the judges does not thereby estop himself from contesting
their rejection of his solution on a ground not made a condition of the
contest in the advertisement."4 In the Minton case there was an offer
to give a prize to anyone rightly counting the dots in the advertise8 Long v. Chronical Publishing Co., 68 Cal. App. 171, 228 P. 873 (1924).
9 Hertz v. Montgomery Journal Publishing Co. (3 Supra).
10 116 Minn. 212, 133 N. W. 573 (1911).
11 183 Pa. 300, 38 Atl. 717 (1897).
12 Draughon's Practical Business College v. Dorsett, 166 S. W. 495 (1914).
13 27 Ariz. 496, 234 P. 551 (1925).
14 36 App. D. C. 137, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 305 (1911).
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ment. The offer also statcd that in case of tie a prize of equal value
would be given to each one making a correct answer. The defendant
then tried to avoid liability to the plaintiff on the ground that the
answer was not as neatly and legibly written as was the one for which
the prize was awarded, although this condition was not in the offer.
On the other hand let us look at two cases which uphold finality of
a judges decision. The first is a Washington case. There it was held
that one who offers a reward for the identification of a person called
"the mysterious Mr. Raffles," in connection with an advertising scheme,
has a right to make himself the sole judge of any dispute arising over
claim to it, and provide that his decision, made in good faith, shall be
final.' 5 In Trego v. Pennsylvania Academy, speaking about the contest
proposal, the court said: "The manifest meaning of the proposal is
that prizes would be given in pursuance of awards, and not contrary
thereto. The persons who shall compose the jury of awards are stated in
the offer. They were to constitute the tribunal to pass upon the merits
of the paintings, and to decide to which prizes should be awarded. Unless so awarded by this jury, no prize was demandable." 10 Thus we see
that we must examine the offer carefully to determine the intentions of
the party, as well as the peculiar circumstances of each case before we
decide whether the decision of the judges is final.
While this discussion does not exhaust the subject on law of contract in regard to prize contests, it does show some of the main interesting situations that arise in an everyday pastime of many Americans. As a whole we saw that a contest contract was much like any
other unilateral contract with the reward cases being its closest relation.
Arthur M. Diamond.

LITTORAL RIGHTS ON THE GREAT LAKES.-Riparian

is from the

Latin word riparius meaning of or belonging to the banks of a river,
which in turn is derived from the Latin word ripa meaning a bank, and
is defined as "pertaining to or situated on the bank of a river." The
word has reference to the bank, therefore, and not to the bed of the
stream.' The words riparian proprietor, however, have been heedlessly
extended from rivers and streams to ownership on the shores of lakes,
a condition
more accurately expressed by the phrase "littoral proprie2
tor."

15 Davidson v. Times Printing Co., 63 Wash. 577, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1164,
116 P. 18 (1911).
16 2 Sadler (Pa.) 313, 3 AtI. 819 (1886).

1 Mobile Dry Docks Co. v. Mobile, 146 Ala. 198, 40 S. 205 (1906).
2 U. S. in City of Boston v. Lecraw, 58 U. S. 426, 15 L. E. 118 (1855).
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Of course, the Great Lakes are not susceptible of private ownership,
in the ordinary meaning of that term any more than is the ocean.
Riparian or littoral rights necessarily include the right of adjacency to
the water as well as the right to have the water come down to the
riparian owner in its natural state, undiminished by anything except
a reasonable use on the part of the upper riparians. The courts are not
fully agreed as to whether the riparian or littoral right will vest title
in the owner to the high or low water mark, but they are agreed that
except for special purposes, the beds of the Great Lakes are not susceptible to private ownership. 3 Generally it can be said that the states
hold the title to the beds of the Great'Lakes in trust for the people of
the entire state for the purposes of navigation and fishing,4 and the
boundary of private property on Lake Michigan is the line where the
water usually stands unaffected by storms or other disturbing causes. 5
Indiana and Michigan seem to be in accord with this contention in that
they hold the low water mark to be the boundary line of private
property with frontage on the Great Lakes.
Some early Michigan cases tended to avoid the low water mark
doctrine and extend the rights of the littoral owner into the water up
to a point where navigation commences, 6 while in 1923, the Supreme
Court of Michigan held that the title of a littoral owner of land on the
Great Lakes extended only to the meander line, it being assumed that
such line followed, at the time it was established, the shore line. 7 Upon
this theory the court then proceeded to hold that all land beyond the
meander line, that is the bed of Lake Michigan, is held in trust by the
state for its citizens, and that a strip of land which was covered by
water at the time of the admission of the state to the Union, even
though thereafter uncovered by reliction or accretion, belongs to the
state as the lake bottom in law, although now dry land in fact, rather
than to the littoral owner whose title was said to extend only to the
meander line.8 The Michigan court in putting forth such an opinion
relied on the case of Munoskong Hunting and Fishing Club which also
was to the effect that a littoral owner on the Great Lakes owns only to
the meander line, and all property beyond said meander line is held
by the state in trust for the use of its citizens. Illinois courts have
adopted a wholly different viewpoint on this matter in that a similar
line of cases have held the littoral rights of landowners along the shores
of Lake Michigan to include the right of accretion as well as the right
of access to the water. 9
3 Miller v. Lincoln Park, 278 Ill. 400, 116 N. E. 178 (1917).
4 People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 11. 138, 45 N. E. 830 (1896).
5 Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ifl. 450, 117 N. E. 123 (1917).
6 Blodgett Lumber Co. v. Peters, 87 Mich. 498, 49 N. W. 917 (1891).
7 Kavanaugh v. Baird, 241 Mich. 240, 217 N. W. 2 (1928).
8 Kavanaugh v. Baird, 159 Mich. 61, 123 N. W. 802 (1909).
9 Miller v. Lincoln Park, 278 Ill. 400, 116 N. E. 178 (1917).
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However, the Michigan ruling that the littoral owner owned only to
the meander line was overruled in 1930, when the Supreme Court held
that the boundary line of littoral owners along the Great Lakes was
the waters edge rather than the meander line, and that the right to
acquisitions to land through accretion or reliction is one of the littoral
rights of said landowner. The court further held that the littoral right,
that is the right of adjacency to the water, is a property right, for the
taking or destruction of which by the state, compensation must be
made. 10 Under this, a better and more just ruling, the littoral owner
has the right to use the water for such general purposes as bathing,
domestic use, etc.; to erect piers, docks and wharves upon and over the
shore lands and water out to the point of navigability for his own use
and benefit." Michigan has since abided by the waters edge doctrine,
and in 1934 reiterated that the owner of lake front property acquires
2
title to soil formed by accretion.'
As we have said before Illinois is in accord with the rule that littoral
or riparian rights extend to the waters edge and include the right of
adjacency to the water. However, some exceptional cases have arisen in
the City of Chicago which I think bear discussion. "Chicago, the City
Beautiful," as it is known, bordering on the shores of Lake Michigan
possesses one of the most beautiful shorelines in the United States. This
is chiefly due to the intricate and spacious parks between the city proper
and the shoreline. The park system as a whole is composed chiefly of
"made land," that is land which has been filled in, so that the shoreline is now some distance from its original edge. This was all done under the provisions of a statute which gave to the municipality of Chicago
the power to build such parks and either contract or condemn the littoral rights of abutting landowners to accomplish this end. 13 Under this
and later statutory provisions, Lake, Lincoln, and Jackson parks were
constructed, and a short time later the municipality changed the name
of Lake Park to Grant Park and conveyed such land as well as the
other parks to the park commissioners. 1 4 The legislature then proceeded to grant the title to submerged lands which was in the state to
the Park Commissioners, 15 and put into effect an "Act to enable Park
Commissioners to alter or enlarge park systems under their control by
acquiring and improving additional lands or territories over beds of
public waters." 16 The consideration going to the owners of said lake
front property for giving up their littoral rights was that the parks
would beautify their property, that no buildings would be built in the
10 Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N. W. 15 (1930).
11 Black's Pomeroy on Water Rights, § 517.
12
Kilmeister v. ZeidIler, 209 Mich. 377, 257 N. W. 721 (1934).
13 Jones Illinois Statutes, § 96:280.
14 Jones Illinois Statutes, § 96:237, 96:238, 96:239, 96:241.
15

16

Jones Illinois Statutes, § 96:247, 96:249.
Jones Illinois Statutes, § 96:286.
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parks which would interfere with their view of the lake, and a money
settlement as well. Cases soon began to arise under the foregoing provisions, and litigation was turbulent and involved as to whether the
right of view and access to the shore constituted a littoral right or
merely an easement.
Boundaries for the construction of Grant Park, for example were
set up by statute and deemed to extend into the lake as far as the
harbor line set up by the Secretary of War. It was agreed that no buildings would be built on the park area to obstruct the view of Lake
Michigan from property abutting the park, without the consent of the
abutting landowners. It was also maintained that by such acts, the
parks would extend to the shores of the lake, and that the title thereto
would carry with it the littoral rights which were to be held in trust by
the state for the people. 17 In 1928 a suit against the Chicago Yacht
Club was brought into court by a landowner whose property was abutting the park. He sought to restrain the defendants from building a
Yacht Club under the provision in the statute that no buildings were
to be constructed on park property. It was first decided that the Yacht
Club was beyond the harbor line, hence not in the park, and secondly,
that the abutting landowners had no littoral rights (having contracted
them away), and therefore had no land bordering on the lake, no right
of access to the lake from their land, and hence that their right of view
over the waters of the lake could be no greater than their right of access.' s It was further held in a later case under the same circumstances,
against the same defendant that the park stopped at the shore, that the
title to the land beyond the shore underlying the waters of the lake was
held in trust for the people by the state, and not by the Park Commissioners: That the littoral rights were appurtenant to the title of the
park, and that though the landowners abutting the park have an easement, it gives the owners no better rights than owners of other similarly
situated lots, and in such cases specific individuals cannot maintain an
action unless their specific property has suffered special injury by reason of the littoral rights of the park held in trust for the public having
been improperly or unlawfully used. 19
A recent decision pertaining to the Park Commissioners in Illinois
was Wall v. Chicago Park District in which Wall was said to have contracted away his littoral rights on Lake Michigan for the consideration
that the Park Commissioners would beautify the view of the lake from
his property. The park district failed to perform the conditions as set
out in the contract and the court rescinded the contract and reinvested
the landowner Wall with his littoral rights. 20
17 South Park Commrs. v. Ward, 248 III. 299, 93 N. E. 910 (1902).
18 McCormick v. Chicago Yacht Club, 331 Ill. $14, 163 N. E. 418 (1928).
19 Stevens Hotel v. Chicago Yacht Club, 339 Ill. 463, 171 N. E. 550 (1930).
20 Wall v. Chicago Park District, 378 Ill. 81, 37 N. E. (2d) 752 (1941).
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The State of Indiana has specifically stated that for a landowner to
possess littoral or riparian rights his land must border on a body of
water. Because a deed reads that the property extends to the meander
line of a stream does not necessarily mean that the property carries
with it littoral or riparian rights unless the meander line actually is the
shore line. If by a mistake in surveying there is land beyond said
meander line rather than water, then title to said land will vest in the
21
State.
In conclusion then we can say that the right of a littoral or riparian
owner to fill in the land in front of his premises seems to have existed
even at common law, but that such rights in modern practice are more
commonly conferred by legislative grant and made the subject of statutory regulation as was the case in Illinois where the park acted as littoral owner (having contracted with the abutting landowners for their
littoral rights), holding said right in trust for the people of the State of
Illinois. This right is exclusive against everyone but the state, 22 although
it is subordinate to and must not be exercised in any manner inconsistent with the public rights.
John F. Power.

PERPETUAL CARE PROVISIONS

FOR CEMETERIES

AND

THEIR CON-

STRUCTION.-The Rule against Perpetuities was an effort by the Eng-

lish lawmakers to make real property more alienable, and to combat the
tendencies of the landed nobility who endeavored to retain their property within their own families forever.
It may be stated in this way: "The Rule against Perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which by possibility
may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the
testator's death, or the effective date of the instrument creating the future interest, and twenty-one years thereafter... ." 1

Because forbidding perpetuities of any kind was found to work a
hardship on charitable institutions who depended upon such trusts for
their support, a statute was passed during the reign of Elizabeth which
2
excluded gifts to charitable uses from the rule against perpetuities.
This statutory exception was not in contradiction to the spirit of the
original rule, but rather in harmony, as it furthered the same common
welfare that the rule was made to protect.

21

78 Ind. App. 327, Tuesburg Land Co. v. State, 131 N. E. 530.

22

State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617 (1914).

1 American
2

jurisprudence, vol.

41, p. 50.

Statute of 43 Elizabeth, Chap. 4.
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Regardless of rules and statutes, there seems to be an instinct of selfpreservation in man that attempts to go even further than the grave in
finding expression. The idea that their cemeteries and gravestones should
eventually become part of the general landscape is repugnant to most
men, and to gentlemen of means, statutes and rules, usually give way
to new approaches and exceptions.
The first approach to the problem by courts was to hold bequests
providing for perpetual care of graves valid, as being for charitable
purposes, the general welfare, and within the charitable use exception
to the rule on Perpetuities. In Smart v. The Town of Durban, 86 Atl.
821 (1913), we find a quotation telling us the reasons of the early
judges who held such trusts charitable.
"1.

2.
3.

For evidence and proof of descent and pedigrees.
What time he that is there buried deceased. (sic)
For example, to follow the good, or to eschew the evil.

4.

To put the living in mind of their end, for all the sons of Adam
must die."
On the other hand, the more general view, and the modern approach
is to declare all such bequests within the rule of perpetuities, and void
unless specially excepted under a statute enacted for that purpose. The
reason one judge found such a fund non-charitable is found in Shippee
v. IndustrialTrust Co., Rhode Island (1920).3
"However commendable this sentiment may be, and however desirable it may be that the graves of the dead be decently and reverently
cared for, nevertheless we do not think a bequest of this kind falls
within the limits of a charitable use. It is not a gift in aid of any public
object, nor for any purpose which affects the public in any way. It
benefits no one. Its purpose is purely private and personal."
In the face of such decisions, the courts neglecting to further the
wishes of wealthy testators, the legislatures stepped in and passed a
variety of acts. (Appended hereto is a selection of sample statutes from
various states.) Many of these laws asked that perpetual care bequests
be considered charitable, many declared them to be charitable, some
merely gave provisions for the setting up of the trusts. A good number
require certain qualifications of the holder of the fund, demanding him
to be a town commissioner, a cemetery corporation, etc. However, there
is little uniformity in the law, and even greater variance in the interpretations of them.
First we shall consider those states whose courts demand statutes
for the creation of perpetual cemetery care trust funds, and insist on
strict compliance with the statutory standards.
8

43 R. I. 115, 110 Aft. 410.
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California
4
In Re Gay (1903).
The only California case on this subject in the books, it takes a strict
stand on the matter.
Margaret Gay bequeathed $2,000 to Lizzie Gay, for perpetual grave
care, and the court held that this was not authorized by the statute that
gave cemetery corporations only, the power to hold such moneys.
Without the help of the statute the bequest could have not been
made, because the use was not charitable it held. The judge pointed out
that if the use was charitable, testators could leave 1/3 of their estates
in trust for the maintenance of their graves. (In California only onethird of a man's property may be left to charity, if he has descendants.)
Illinois
Mason v. Bloomfield Library Association (1909).5
A perpetual trust to take care of a private burial lot is not a charitable trust, and neither can it stand under the statute which permits
cemetery corporations to hold money for such purposes.
McCartney v. Jacobs (1919).6
A bequest of an unincorporated cemetery association of a fund to
be held in trust in perpetuity to maintain burial lots violates the rule
against perpetuities, and not coming under the statute is void.
Massachusetts
Bates v. Bates (1883).7
This is the leading American case holding a perpetual care trust not
a charitable use. It also holds that such trusts are void under the Rule
against Perpetuities when there is no statute or no compliance with the
statute.
Connecticut
Coit v. Comstock (1883).8
Here the bequest for perpetual care of a grave was mixed with a
real charitable use. Surplus after grave having been maintained going
to a church. The court held that such a mixture can not validate and
preserve the entire bequest. Held that Statute is necessary to create such
a fund.
Tennessee
Travis v. Randolph (1938).9
"All cash to be left in bank, the interest to be used for the upkeep
of the graves of myself and W. S. Hite."
Held void as a perpetuity.
138 Cal. 552, 71 Pac. 707.
237 li. 442, 86 N. E. 1044.
6 288 III. 568, 123 N. E. 557.
7 45 Am. Rep. 305.
8 50 Am. Rep. 29.
9 172 Penn. 392, 112 S. W. (2d) 833.
4
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Arkansas
Union Trust Co. v. Rossi (1929).10
"I direct that $2,000 shall be set apart and kept as a fund, the principal or interest shall be used to keep the grave of my wife and myself

in order."
The Court: "It is doubtless true, however, that the testator could
have provided for the burial of his own ana the body of his wife in a
cemetery established for taking perpetual care of the graves of those
interred therein, since that would not have involved an unlawful suspension of the ownership of personal property."
Held invalid.
Other Jurisdictions holding the same, that is requiring a statute before recognizing perpetual care funds:
Texas, Alabama, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island.
A smaller number of states hold the liberal view, either recognizing
the bequest as charitable, or not requiring the statute, or interpreting
whatever available statute there is freely and easily.
Delaware
State for use of Woodlands Cemetery Co. v. Lodge (1940).11
Where bequest to Pennsylvania cemetery corporation of a sum sufficient to keep family burial lots in perpetual care out of the interest was
directed to be administered in Pennsylvania, where by statute such a
bequest does not fail because made in perpetuity, but is held to be made
for a charitable use, the public policy of Delaware could not be said to
be violated by the directions of the will."
(But, in 96 Atl. 795, Delaware court holds such a bequest valid
without a statute and without giving any reason for so holding.)
Kentucky
Street v. Cave Hill Inv. Co. (1921).12
Statute says: "perpetuities permitted for any charitable or humane

purpose."
Court holds a bequest for perpetual care for a private grave not
charitable, but a "humane purpose," and therefore a valid trust.
New York
In Re Beck's Estate.1 8
Bequest for perpetual care of burial lot was held "for a charitable
and benevolent use" within such statute limiting perpetuities.
Iowa
Hipp v. Hibbs (1932).14
10
11
12

180 Ark. 552, 22 S. W. (2d) 370.
41 Del. 125, 16 AtI. (2d) 250.
191 Ky. 422, 230 S. W. 536.

13 255 N. Y. S. 857.
14

215 Iowa 253, 245 N. W. 257.
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Liberal and illogical decision.
Here the testator left $1,000 to his trustees for perpetual care of a
private grave. At this time there was no statute to permit this, because
under Statute 10211 of the existing code only special corporations could
take and hold the money for this use.
However: "Had the will of the testator in this instance bequeathed
the sum to any of the associations or corporations named in section
10211 of the code, it would have clearly been valid. It seems to us that
the case presents a question of statutory interpretation."
Held, believe it or not, that the bequest was valid.

An obviously charitable exception to the Rule against Perpetuities,
while at the same time providing for the perpetual care of graves, is the
case where a testator leaves his money for the upkeep of entire cemeteries. (Chapman v. Newell, 125 N. W. 324, Iowa (1910)).
In Rhode Island the courts have been given wide powers as evidenced
in the following case:
Todd v. St. Mary's Church (1923).15
Held that a $3,000 bequest for perpetual cemetery care is not a
charitable use, but void as a perpetuity. However, under a statute giving such discretion to the court, it decided that $500 of the above fund
was a reasonable amount for grave care, and ordered the money deducted from the estate and paid over to the Local Town Council to
hold for that purpose. (See Statutes, (b), attached.)
Irrevocable
French v. Kensico Cemetery (1942).16
A perpetual care fund given to a cemetery association is irrevocable.
This is not because it is a trust, but because the contracting cemetery
would be subjected to the liability of keeping the cemetery in order
without consideration if the donee rescinded. (Because there is a state
law imposing the duty of proper maintenance on cemetery associations.)
FLOWERS
We have three cases determining the validity of bequests for perpetual placing of flowers on graves. The law on this differs in several
jurisdictions, one court in particular holding very strictly, in direct opposition to the spirit if not the letter of the statute.
Not only does the Rhode Island court forbid the perpetual placing
of flowers on graves, but in a bequest that provides for that service in
addition to regular care and maintenance, complying fully with the
15 45 R. I. 282, 120 At. 577.
16 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 826.
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statute as regarding the trustee, a cemetery corporation, the court
strikes down the entire bequest, including the ordinary care and
maintenance clause.
Rhode Island
7
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Swan Point Cemetery (1938).1
"Second, I order my above named executor to pay to the Swan Point
Cemetery Corporation the sum of $1,000, the interest therefrom to be
used for flowers on Decoration Day, and keeping my monument in condition."
1. Held that the placing of flowers was not one of the corporation's
purposes under its charter, which included "to apply the same or the
proceeds or income thereof to the care, support, or improvements of said
cemetery, or any part thereof, or any lot or monument or structure
thereon."
2. Neither does the perpetual care of graves statutes, Rhode Island
General Laws, include or permit this.
3. Because the "flower fund" fails, the rest of the trust for keeping the monument in repair falls with it.
Indiana
McClarnon v. Slage (1939).1s
Flowers were permitted to be put on the graves five times a year, on
special days, in perpetuity, under an ordinary cemetery care statute.
New Jersey
Gallagherv. Venturini (1928).1 9
"13th. I direct my executrices to keep up my mother's grave with
flowers each year."
Held to be charitable, hence not violating the rule against perpetuities.
The law relating to cemetery trust funds for perpetual care is in extreme confusion, and the decisions on the validity of such trusts go from
one extreme to another, using many and varied lines of reasoning.
The only safe thing to do, if one wants to set up a trust of this kind,
is to refer to the state statute, and comply with it strictly. In every
state there is some way of setting the fund up properly by law, and it
usually consists of bequeathing the principal to an incorporated cemetery association, to be administered by them, using the interest only
to keep up the grave sites and monuments. The surest way, in most
states, to create an invalid trust, is to leave the money to a friend,
executor or personal trustee, for their personal administration.
17 62 R. I. 83, 3 AUt. (2d) 236.
18 215 Ind. 157, 19 N. E. (2d) 252.
19

124 N. J. Eq. 538, 3 AtI. (2d) 157.
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California
Health and Safety Code, 1939, section 8776.
"The sums paid in or contributed to the fund authorized by this
article are hereby expressly permitted as and for a charitable and eleemosynary purpose. Such contributions are a provision for the discharge
of a duty due from the persons contributing to the person or persons interred or to be interred in the cemetery and likewise a provision for the
benefit and protection of the public by preserving, beautifying, and
keeping cemeteries from becoming unkept and places of reproach and
desolation in the communities in which they are situated. No payment,
gift, grant, bequest, or other contribution for such purpose is invalid by
reason of any indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated
as beneficiaries in the instruments creating the fund nor is the fund or
any contribution to it invalid as violating any law against perpetuities
or the suspension of the power of alienation of title to property."
Indiana
Burns Indiana Statutes, 1933, section 21-212.
"Any church, corporation, or association which owns a cemetery
shall have the power to receive from any person a deposit or legacy of
money to be held in trust in perpetuity or for such period as the donor
or testator shall designate in writing, the earnings of which deposit or
legacy shall be used for the purpose of keeping in good condition any
lot or lots, monument, vault, or gravestone in said cemetery, that may
be designated by such donor or testator."
Section 21-214 provides for the administering and keeping of such
funds by County Commissioners in Indiana.
Michigan
Michigan Statutes Annotated, 21.855.
"The board of trustees of any corporation (cemetery) organized under this act may provide for . . . and no such trust shall be invalid because contravening any statute or rule of law forbidding accumulations
of income, but shall be valid notwithstanding such statute or rule.
Texas
Vernon's Texas Statutes, Article 915.
"Said trust and the administration thereof shall not be regarded and
held to be a perpetuity, but as a provision for the discharge of a duty
from the party founding such blocks or lots and to the public."
In Texas, however, 75% only of the trust can be used for the designated lot; the other 25% must be used for the general upkeep of the
whole cemetery.
Illinois
Jones Illinois Statutes, 17.54 gives trust funds for the perpetual care
of cemeteries validity, and makes laws of mortmain or against perpetuities inapplicable.
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Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania General Laws, section 9, par. 4.
"No disposition of property hereafter made for the maintenance or
care of any cemetery, churchyard or other place for the burial of the
dead, or any portion thereof, or grave therein or monuments or such
erections on or about the same, shall fail by reason of such disposition
having been made in perpetuity, but said disposition shall be held to
be made for a charitable use."
New Jersey
New Jersey General Laws, 1939, 8:2-30.
"Any Person, by his last will and testament or otherwise, may create
a trust fund to be held in perpetuity or for a lesser time, the income
thereof to be used for the care or embellishment of any cemetery or
grave, plot or lot, the graves therein, the tombstones or monuments
thereon, or a mausoleum. Provided, however, that where any last will
and testament purports to create a trust fund for any of the enumerated
purposes, the court of chancery of New Jersey may, upon or prior to
the settlement of such an account, hear and determine the question
whether, in view of the size of the estate and other pertinent circumstances, the testamentary provision aforesaid is reasonable, and should
the court find that the amount of the trust fund so provided is excessive, it may fix in lieu thereof a reasonable sum, which said sum shall
not exceed the maximum amount of such trust fund, and providing,
further, that the person or corporation designated to hold such a trust
fund shall consent to the hearing and determination as herein provided."
Iowa
Iowa General Statutes, 10198.
"1. The effect of this statute is to permit perpetual trusts or endowments for privately owned cemeteries. It has no application by inference or in terms to public cemeteries the maintenance of which is a
charitable act, and therefore within the recognized exception to the operation of the statute of perpetuities."
South Carolina
South Carolina Code, 1932, section 9052.
"No gift, devise, bequest, or settlement in trust shall be held to be
a perpetuity where the same is made for the purpose of maintaining,
caring for, or keeping in repair any tomb, monument, burial lot, burial
ground, or cemetery, whether public or private, where the remains of
human beings are interred and all said gifts, devises, bequests or settlements in trust or otherwise are hereby declared to be for a charitable
purpose."
Harold Berliner.
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PUBLIC POLICY AND THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DE-

CREES.-In introducing the topic of public policy and the recognition
of foreign divorce decrees it is well to first investigate the factual situation regarding divorce in this country.
As a purely practical matter, and entirely unrelated to the constitutional problem of "full faith and credit" of foreign, (meaning sister
states), judgments in divorce proceedings, it is clear that one of the
chief reasons for the recognition of divorce decrees of other states is to
insure that adultery and loose moral relationships will not be encouraged. The law puts the mantle of the marriage relationship over those
obtaining easy divorces so as to give the relationship a legal rather than
illegal aspect. The courts feel, either rightly or wrongly, that it is better to sanctify a doubtful situation, rather than encourage loose moral
relationships by refusing to grant the divorce and run the chance of
the parties, or at least one of the parties in the marriage relationship,
living in promiscuity and a doubtful relationship. In these questions
the court must make a choice as to the effect, practical effect, of its
decisions. Either to sanction or not sanction the general divorce because of allied social and moral problems.
By statute, in Indiana, the courts sustaining the law, have provided
that Indiana will not give "full faith and credit" to the foreign judgments of courts when attempting to enforce a judgment on a cognovit
promissory note. The law states, and the courts sustain, that it is
against the public policy of the state of Indiana to honor or recognize
the legality of cognovit notes. This is an unrelated problem to the subject of divorce; however, it does set and establish a precedent in Indiana and considering the broad social problems involved in divorce actions, the ruling is entitled to consideration in the matter of divorce.
Since it is established that the Indiana courts are not required to
give "full faith and credit" in all cases to foreign judgments, the problem resolves itself into a discussion of which public policy is to be observed in Indiana so far as the recognition of foreign divorce decrees
is concerned. The Indiana public policy might not recognize a foreign
divorce, using the cases involving cognovit notes as authority. However,
under the Federal Constitution, Indiana is required to give full faith
and credit in such cases.
An alarming situation is being created in the United States because
of the great divorce ratio. Homes are broken, children are left to shift
for themselves, and what is most deplorable, the sanctity of the marriage relationship is being overthrown. The divorce mills of Reno and
like jurisdictions are encouraging this decline because of their easy divorce proceedings. On grounds of public policy, I do not believe such a
decree, as that of the Nevada courts should be granted "full faith and
credit," at least in the State of Indiana.

NOTES
The case of Haddock v. Haddock 1 denied the right to secure a divorce in a state other than that of domicile of matrimony where the
spouse is still domiciled in that state. In other words, a husband or wife
could not leave the domicile of matrimony and go to another state and
therein acquire a domicile, no matter how long he or she resided therein, that would entitle him or her to bring an action for divorce within
that state where the other spouse still resided in the domicile of matrimony.
The Haddock case was overruled by the Williams case, Williams v.
North Carolina.2 In that case the court decided that if there was a
bona fide domicile in another state, other than the state of the domicile
of matrimony (the state where the husband and wife last lived together
as husband and wife), that domicile would be consideied valid so far
as granting the courts jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding.
The case however, which was not overruled by the Williams case is
the case of Bell v. Bell.8 In that case the court determined "a case in
which the Court held that a decree of divorce was not entitled to full
faith and credit when it had been granted on constructive service by the
courts of a state in which neither spouse was domiciled."
According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary a domicile can only be
changed by making a new home with intention of abandoning the old
and to adopt the new. Certainly, in those states, such as Nevada, the
divorce petitioner cannot show an actual intent to adopt the Nevada
jurisdiction as his new domicile. The Nevada residence is only for the
purpose of obtaining the divorce. In this respect the Bell case (supra)
will apply, or should apply, and other jurisdictions need not give "full
faith and credit" because of this lack of domiciliary intent.
A r1ecent case of Davis v. Davis,4 decided August 1, 1944, by the
Court of Appeals in Ohio adopted the above opinion. The court stated:
"'Domicile' means place where one has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a temporary or special purpose, but with the intention of
making it his permanent home and to which whenever he is absent he
intends to return." "Where citizen of Ohio did not obtain a bona fide
domicile in Nevada where he had gone solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce as soon as possible and of returning to Ohio, in wife's action for alimony, court was not required under full faith and credit
clause to recognize divorce decree procured in Nevada by her husband.'
It is my opinion that from a purely legal point of view, divorces
such as the Reno type, are not entitled to "full faith and credit" if it
is shown that the person obtaining the divorce went to the jurisdiction
merely for the purpose of obtaining rfesidence or domicile for a divorce.
1 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867.

2 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. Ed. 279.
3 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 54 L. Ed. 804.
4 Davis v. Davis, 57 N. E. (2d) 703, August 1, 1944.
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There is a great distinction and a great public policy involved between
the domicile of matrimony and the domicile of divorce or separation.
The intent should be fulfilled without question, that the applicant for
a divorce, intended to make that jurisdiction his domicile, not for purposes of divorce but for purposes of actual residence, with an intention
to abandon the old domicile and adopt the new.
Further, from a social viewpoint, a policy such as above set out
would discourage divorce and would promote a healthier social behavior. In view of the alarming divorce problem, it would be well for
courts to again investigate this problem of proper intent and proper
jurisdiction to determine if "full faith and credit" as it effects local
public policy should be considered when granting validity to foreign
divorce decrees.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Since this paper was written the United States Su-

preme Court on May 21, 1945, on rehearing the Williams v. North
Carolinacase ruled that other states are not bound by the "full faith and
credit" clause of the United States Constitution, to recognize divorce
decrees of Nevada courts, where it is shown that no actual intent to
change the residence of the parties to. Nevada and where the domicile
in Nevada is established for the purpose of the divorce only, and the
parties returned immediately after the decree of divorce, to the state
where they had bona fide residence.
Robert A. Oberfell.

RIGHTS OF CREDITORS OF FRAUDULENT GRANTEE.-There are many
cases in the law where there is a balance of interests. One of these cases,
and one of great importance, is presented in a situation where there is
a fraudulent conveyance and the creditors of the fraudulent grantee
levy on the property. The question then presented for determination
is who shall prevail, the creditors of the fraudulent grantor or the
creditors of the fraudulent grantee?
In order to fully understand the importance and all of the ramifications of this problem it is necessary to review some of the more important principles of the law of fraudulent conveyances.
A conveyance has been defined as fraudulent when its object or
effect is to defraud another, or its intent is t6 avoid some duty or debt
owing by the party making the transfer.' This definition has been broadened by the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act which declares that
every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who

1 Turner v. Hammock, 18 S. W. (2d) 285, 229 Ky. 836 (1929).
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is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors
without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the
obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.2
At the outset it is important to note that although the statutes declare a fraudulent conveyance void, it is not void in the sense that it is
a nullity, it is merely voidable at the instance of the creditors. 3
Thus we see that a fraudulent conveyance is a valid conveyance as
far as the original parties and their heirs are concerned. 4 In fact where
the parties to the conveyance are in pari delicto the courts 5 will not
reenforce a promise made by the fraudulent transferee to reconvey
the property to the fraudulent transferor. However, where the parties
to a suit for the cancellation of a conveyance in fraud of creditors are
not in pari delicto, equity 6 will intervene in the protection of the less
guilty.
Of course a transfer of property that comes within the definition
of a fraudulent conveyance is generally invalid as to the creditors of the
grantor and they, the creditors, may disregard the conveyance and
sell
7
the property while it is in the hands of the fraudulent transferee.
The rule is different in the case of a sale by a vendor to defraud his
creditors made to an innocent purchaser for value, the courts 8 holding
in this situation that the rights of the bona fide transferee are superior
to those of the trausferor's creditors.
And again if the transferee although fraudulent has transferred the
property to a bona fide purchaser for value, the bona fide purchaser
holds the property discharged of the fraud and has rights that are
superior to those of the creditors. 9
We have previously noticed that while the transferee will not be
compelled to return the property to the fraudulent transferor, he may
restore it, in which event the ownership is again vested in the transferor.10
However, upon the first conveyance the title to- the property becomes vested in the grantee so that a reconveyance by him to the
grantor will be void as against the creditors of the grantee. 1
Thus we have seen that although it is generally true that a creditor
may treat a fraudulent conveyance as void, there are certain exceptions
2 Unif. Fraud. Con. Act, Sec. 4.
3

4

5
6
7
8

9
10

11

Anderson v. Roberts, 18 Johns (N. Y.) 513 (1820).
Jackson v. Garnsy, 16 Johns (N. Y.) 189 (1819).
Dent v. Fergusson, 132 U. S. 50, 33 L. Ed. 242, 10 S. Ct. 13 (1889).
Coleman v. Coleman, 48 Ariz. 337, 61 P. (2d) 106 (1936).
Scoville v. Halladay, 16 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 43 (1886).
Jones v. Simpson, 116 U. S. 609, 29 L. Ed. 742, 6 S. Ct. 538 (1885).
Morrow v. New England Mfg. Co., 57 F. 685, 60 F. 341 (1894).
iMcCann v. Commissioner, 87 F. (2d) 275, 108 A. L. R. 504 (1037).
Farmers Bank v. Gould, 48 W. Va. 99, 35 S. E. 878 (1000).
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and it is quite possible that some third person has a right that is superior
to that of the defrauded creditor. The issue then is, should the creditors
of the fraudulent grantee come within the class of exceptions of those
whose rights are superior to those of the fraudulent creditor?
It is apparent from an examination of the problem that both of these
adverse creditors have a meritorious claim. The creditor of the grantor
has a legal right to the property in order to satisfy a debt, and if the
law prefers him it is merely removing obstacles fraudulently interposed to prevent the exercise of this legal right. Of course, if the
creditors of the grantee have acted and have taken the property into
their own custody, then the court is faced with a balance of interests.
However, even though there seems to be a balance of interests, the
courts have favored the creditors of the fraudulent grantee who have
laid hold of the property. An early case 12 holding that an attachment
by a creditor of a fraudulent vendee of real estate, not proved to have
notice of the nature of the vendee's title, on the property while in the
possession of his debtor, will hold the property against the creditors
of the fraudulent vendor. And this is not an isolated instance because
the courts 's have consistently given a priority to the creditors of the
fraudulent grantee.
All that remains to be seen then is the reason for this preference. It
can be seen that the reason for this preference might be based on the
doctrine of estoppel, because there is action on one side and a lack of
it on the other. For we have seen that the conveyance is not void but
only voidable at the election of the creditors and where they have failed
to act they should not now be able to complain because some other
person has taken affirmative action in order to get the property under
his control.
The common law statute 14 provides that the defrauded creditor of
the grantor may set aside the conveyance in all cases except where a
bona fide purchaser for value has intervened. And our modern Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 15 gives a defrauded creditor the
right to set aside the conveyance, or disregard it in all cases except
where the property is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value.
Our question then narrows down to whether or not a creditor who has
levied on the property is a bona fide purchaser.
There is a conflict of authority on this point, an early case 16 holding that "the attaching creditor is not a bona fide purchaser for value,
although in some respects he may resemble one." However, more re12

Stockton v. Craddick, 4 La. Ann. 282 (1849).

18 Applegate v. Applegate, 107 Iowa 312 (1899).
14 13 Eliz. ch. S.

UniL Fraud. Con. Act, Sec. 9.
16 In Re Mullen, 101 Fed. 413 (1900).
15

NOTES
cent cases 17 have held that an execution creditor is applying the proceeds of his attachment to the payment of an antecedent debt and is
within the definition of fair consideration and stands in the .position of
a bona fide purchaser as to whom the conveyance is valid.
Thus we see that under two different views that the creditors of the
vendee are given a priority. However, since the creditors of the grantor
find themselves cut off because of the fraud, they may proceed against
the fraudulent grantee and hold him personally liable for the debt.' 8
Eugene Charles Wohihorn.

TORT ACTIONS AGAINST AIRPORT OR AIRPLANE OPERATORS By OwNERS OF ADJACENT PRoPERTY.-The purpose of this paper is to deter-

mine which of two methods should be used in obtaining relief against
an airport or airplane operator for damage suffered by adjacent landowners. For this purpose the discussion will be divided into two sections: suits in trespass, and suits in tort for damages for nuisance.

The problem of the airplane and airport was small before this war
compared to the problems anticipated in the post-war world. Great
plans have been made and astounding changes are envisioned for the
use of the airplane. The development of aviation since the first world
war has been unequalled in any other field of transportation. The progress of aviation as a means of commercial transportation is so important that it supersedes any detriment that property owners might suffer as a result of the flight of planes over their property or because of
noise, light or any other nuisance that might result from the operation
of an airport or airplane.
Nevertheless, property owners are entitled to some protection from

such nuisance and to a right of action for damages resulting from negligence or from the resulting nuisance. This discussion is limited to two
of the most common actions available to these property owners against
the airplane or airport operator.
It has become apparent that the most logical, reasonable and successful cause of action has been an action for damages because of
nuisance. Under an action for trespass, a pilot could be sued every time
he had made a low flight or some other infraction of the regulations.
However, in an action for nuisance it must be shown definitely that actual damages were suffered, and if this can be proved, relief will be
given.
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It has been held that an airport is not a nuisance per se, but its mode
of operation may make it so. In Warren Township School District v.
City of Detroit' the Michigan Supreme Court made the above statement. Here, the township attempted to stop the city of Detroit from
constructing an airport on the grounds that it would cause great general
disturbances and would he a nuisance. The court said that the airport
could not be a nuisance until it had actually made itself such and that
airports were not nuisances per se.
In Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation2 an injunction was
granted against the airport. Here, it was shown that there had been a
profound depreciation in value of a real estate project near the airport
caused by the noise, dust and bright lights from the airport at night.
The court said that since the owners of the real estate project had informed the airport owners before the port was constructed an injunction should be and was granted as against the airport.
Dust is oftentimes one of the items complained of. In Gay v. Taylor 3 the court said, ". .. the dust complained of undoubtedly constitutes a real annoyance. It is caused chiefly by traffic over the driveway
to the landing field, and is used by spectators attracted by curiosity as
well as by customers and pilots, and employees of the port, who drive
over it in automobiles. The dust is carried by the wind and the blast of
propellers of planes onto and into the premises and dwelling house of
the Gays. Less dust came from the landing field, since the airport was
apparently well sodded. However, defendants must assume responsibility for raising the dust complained of, whether it comes from the drive,
way or is stirred up in the landing field by the blast of air from the propellers of planes warming up or taxiing over the ground." This is memly
the opinion in this one case and about the one item complained of. If,
however, it can be established that any one of the things complained of
is a nuisance, relief can be had.
It is generally believed that spite structures can be removed by the
court's order. Constructing towers and other such objects, merely to
make the landing on a nearby airport perilous, is an act which can be
4
abated.
Generally, an injunction can be had against continual low flights
over one's land. In Vanderslice v. Shawn 5 the court stated, "Here, the
operation of the airport has not been found to be a nuisance, except
insofar as the repeated low flights are concerned. If these be eliminated,
the sole element of nuisance will be removed." In Mohican and Reena
v. Tobias 6 the court enjoined all flights under 100 feet. In Burnham v.
1 i14 N. W. (2d) 134 ....... Mich ....... (1944).
2 41 F. (2d) 929 (1930).
8 19 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 31 (Ct. of Com. P1. Chester Co. Pa., Sept. 8, 1932).
4 Commonwealth v. Bestecki, 43 Dauphin County, Rep. 446.
5 27 At. (2d) 87 (1943).
6 U. S. Av. Rep. 1 (1938).

